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Abstract— A look at Identity as a Service (IDaaS) and Federated 
Identity Management (FIM) and acceptance amongst organizations, 
users, and general population. While FIM has shown acceptance 
amongst educational, commercial and government organizations, the 
general population acting has not seen the level of trust as the former. 
What are the barriers or enablers for acceptance that might allow, in 
the extreme example, the ability to logon to a bank with your Facebook 
credentials and transact business? 
Keywords—federation; security; identity management 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many solutions, products, and protocols exist for 
establishing federated identity for enabling users to securely 
logon to Service Providers (SP) for various purposes, yet, there 
is still a chasm with regards to trust. That is whether consumers 
trust both Identity Providers (IdP) and SP to participate in a 
federation.  
We take a look at research that examines commercial and 
public organizations and various implementation impediments 
and facilitators.  Additionally, while Federation amongst 
universities, government, and, commercial partners is much 
more prevalent, we lack that level of acceptance for the general 
population. We take a look at government efforts, most notably 
in the European Community towards establishing a common 
credential provider and broker-based approach. 
Finally, for future research, we ask a rhetorical question – 
when will I be able to use my Facebook Identity to logon to my 
bank? 
II. FEDERATION IDENTITY BASICS 
Initially organizations started to use Single-Sign-On (SSO) 
to unify authentication systems together for better management 
and security. SSO was adopted across different internal 
applications and via APIs for external applications. With 
platforms spread across different devices bringing in together 
user authentication and authorization with increased security is 
a challenge which Federated identity tries to address [5]. 
In Federated identity an application uses an identity 
management system that stores user’s electronic identity to 
authenticate. It decouples authentication and authorization 
functions. It avoids a situation where every application has to 
maintain a set of credentials for every user [5]. 
III. GOVERNMENT SPONSORED FEDERATION 
Since 1995, EU member nations have been implementing 
various forms of electronic Identity Management (eIDM) based 
on the interoperability of eSignatures.  The lack of an EU-wide 
legal framework governing such an implementation has resulted 
in difficulties in defining actor responsibilities and liabilities.  
Cross-border requirements amongst EU countries have created 
incremental challenges.  This has unfortunately resulted in a 
degree of “subsidiarity” amongst the member nations: each 
member nation maintaining its autonomy and responsibility. [1] 
Both the U.S. and the U.K. governments have decided that 
citizens will authenticate to government resources using 
Federated Identity; however, neither government wishes to 
perform the role of IdP[1].  This defers to private industry the 
opportunity to offer identity management solutions to 
consumers while still not answering questions such as (1) who 
will oversee the solution design and implementation, and (2) 
who will control and monitor the governance of the solution.  
What limited functionality has been implemented on the 
consumer side in the UK has been received with a reasonable 
level of trust on the part of the consumer, with ease-of-use 
scoring the highest.  Opportunities have been identified[1]: 
• 50% left the site once reaching the hub page, 
• 25% left the site once reaching the consent page, 
• 34% of users felt threatened, not reassured, by the privacy. 
 
IV. INCOMMON – WHERE IT’S WORKING 
Within the U.S. driven by the research community, “The 
InCommon Federation is the identity management federation for 
US research and education, and their sponsored partners” [2].  
They currently service over 7.5 Million users with this 
federation amongst 430 education and nearly 200 other 
organizations[2].   
The success of InCommon may be linked back to the 
Shibboleth model that was implemented, along with Trust in 
Privacy from the IdPs and alleviation of significant identity 
management functionality for SP[3]. This also was a step-up for 
many organizations in having better security than previous 
implementations.  For example, JSTOR had been using IP 
address blocks to permit access from users cross Universities.  
The implementation of InCommon using Shibboleth allowed 
clarity in who is requiring access with some level of assurance 
that the actual user has been authenticated and permissioned for 
access by the supplying IdP amongst the trust. 
V. CONSUMER FEDERATION 
What may be core to the success of InCommon is a captive 
community of practitioners that utilize the services offered 
within the Federation for their daily needs. It may also be 
attributed to a community well versed in the underlying 
technology, or at least comfortable with it in general.  We still 
haven’t seen the ability to access your Bank Account through 
this federation. 
Amongst the general population we have different 
motivations that may attribute to the slow uptake or resistance.  
In the UK, the Identity Assurance (IDA) program issued 
guidelines and mandates for implementation of an approach that 
has yet to take hold[1].   
In a series of studies[1] various obstacles were cited ranging 
from poor User Interface Design, to Security and Trust concerns.  
Major concerns still exist over unauthorized release of privacy 
information, along with inability to understand associations of 
an IdP to a SP – one stating “PayPal have nothing to do with the 
National Health Service (NHS)”[1]. 
The lack of general Trust in the federation amongst the 
general public may be attributed to their naivety or lack of 
understanding of the overall Federation model. The same study 
suggests that this may be improved through better User 
Experience (UX) and also presents as part of that argument 
which examples of UX worked better or worse in their 
studies[1]. 
The same study also identifies which types of IdPs seem 
more trustworthy, or may be a candidate for use within a 
Federation scenario amongst the general population, with the 
post-office and cable providers being amongst the highest 
potential for “Would use” in a Federation scenario[1]. 
Establishing eIDM trust in the eyes of the general population 
has presented itself as a significant barrier to full scale end-to-
end implementation of Federated Identity.  These roadblocks 
include issues such as: 
• No clear definition on what constitutes an eID, 
• Disagreement on which governing body (governmental or 
private) should create and manage the eID, 
• Disagreement on which governing body should manage 
and/or regulate the data flows amongst the various FIM SP, 
• How the integrity/reliability/privacy of the identity will be 
ensured; who will stand behind this guarantee. 
VI. RISKS 
Trust, security and liability are three key areas of risk which 
are constantly challenged with FIM/IDaaS systems.  The 
trustworthiness of the user, the IdP or SP may  be in question by 
the entity who did not perform the identity screening.  The 
development of the NIST[7] identity credentialing via the 
service levels is one method to assist SP and IdP in properly 
screening their members. 
From a security perspective, Man-in-the-Middle attacks in 
an open network can lead to theft on identity credentials which 
allow access to confidential information.  Misuse of the IdP and 
SP with user identity information causing the risk of IdP 
becoming malicious and risking the use of user identity 
information in SPs to share it with other SPs or third parties.[6] 
In many of the types networks where FIM/IDaaS systems 
have been tried the questions always arises, what happens if 
something goes wrong? Or more importantly, who is liable?  A 
system could become unavailable to authenticate users, causing 
problems for SP relying on its operation.  And authentication 
itself could fail, allowing unauthorized users to be incorrectly 
authenticated as other users. In both cases, rules that determine 
which party is responsible are a potential source of conflict.[3]  
Liability arrangements must be clearly defined and articulated 
for all stakeholders.[3] 
VII. SUMMARY AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Globally, there is consensus that new research would be 
needed to coordinate existing knowledge and know-how into a 
coherent vision capable of being seamlessly implemented cross-
border and cross-culture, spawning the required trust and 
confidence at all levels. [4] 
A number of conceptual models exist which demonstrate 
that there is a need for a unified solution to federated identity 
management: for individuals, businesses and government 
agencies alike.  These technological solutions have been proven 
to be viable and cost effective for many of today’s e-commerce 
environments, yet full scale implementation is constrained by a 
low level of trust on the part of the general population of the 
technology and of the SPs.  Partly the result of misinformation 
and misunderstanding, many of the FIM participants would be 
more inclined to participate in these eIDM offerings if they 
could only get beyond the trust issues. 
Further research would be required to address consumer 
concerns: 
• Who should ‘own’ (i.e. regulate) the solution? 
• What would it take to raise confidence in any solution? 
• What is the model for user recourse if the solution breaks? 
 
Reviews of current state of eID implementations indicate 
that, at least for the short term, consumers may not be able to use 
a common access/authentication method for secure online 
resource access control. 
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